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Abstract 
Using the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an 
exogenous improvement to mandatory financial reporting, we document evidence supporting a 
complementary effect between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. We find that firms in 
countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 experience an increase in both the likelihood and frequency 
of management earnings forecasts relative to firms in countries that did not mandate IFRS. We 
also find that the increase in management forecasts is higher in countries where prior local 
GAAP are more different from IFRS or legal enforcement is stronger. Consistent with the 
confirmatory role of mandatory reporting, we also find that the increase in management forecasts 
following IFRS adoption is significantly mitigated for firms in financial industries, whose 
financial statements are less verifiable due to fair value estimates. Last, we find that the liquidity 
effect of IFRS is much larger when firms issue more management forecasts, suggesting that 
voluntary disclosure is an indirect mechanism through which IFRS brings benefits to capital 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate disclosure is critical for well-functioning capital markets (Healy and Palepu [2001]). 
Mandated financial reporting and voluntary disclosure are two channels of corporate disclosure 
by which managers communicate private information with capital markets and both are relevant, 
as evidenced by stock price as well as liquidity changes associated with the two types of 
disclosures (Welker [1995], Leuz and Verrecchia [2000], Leuz and Schrand [2009], 
Balakrishnan, Billings, Ljungqvist, and Kelly [2012]). Understanding this relation is the first step 
in addressing the long-standing research question on what economic rationale justifies regulating 
corporate disclosure and whether voluntary disclosure obviates the need for reporting regulations. 
Several additions to US GAAP have been made since the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
in response to investors’ demand for transparent financial markets. Such reforms typically 
introduce new rules to modify the content of, and the practices that bring about, firms’ mandated 
financial reports, which in turn would change the level of voluntary disclosure. Given that 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure are likely interdependent, researchers and regulators cannot 
assess the economic role of reporting regulations without considering its effect on voluntary 
disclosure.  
Although the two channels of disclosure are inextricably linked, the precise nature of this 
relation is not well understood. This study investigates the interaction between mandatory 
financial reporting and voluntary disclosure by employing the mandatory adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 as an exogenous change to 
mandatory reporting to examine changes in firms’ voluntary disclosure practices. To measure 
disclosure, we focus on a discretionary action, namely the extent to which managers provide 
earnings forecasts, the most prominent performance measure that a firm supplies to investors. 
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Ex-ante, it is unclear how the mandatory adoption of IFRS could influence management 
forecasts. On the one hand, mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure can be 
complements, wherein the former produces verifiable information that improves the credibility 
of the latter and therefore encourages managers to issue more forecasts, i.e. the confirmatory role 
of mandatory reporting. Prior studies document improved mandatory reporting quality following 
IFRS adoption, evidenced by earnings with lower manipulation and higher value relevance, 
timeliness, and information content (Barth, Landsman, and Lang [2008], Landsman, Maydew, 
and Thornock [2011]). Therefore, given the evidence that IFRS improves the verifiability of 
earnings, the complementary view suggests that the mandatory adoption of IFRS should increase 
management forecasts. On the other hand, mandatory financial reporting and voluntary 
disclosure could also be substitutes. Managers often use voluntary disclosure to supplement 
mandatory reporting and communicate their superior knowledge of firms’ performance to 
investors. Compared to domestic accounting standards, IFRS has more extensive disclosure 
requirements and recognition rules. Disclosures that were previously classified as mandatory 
may now fall into the mandatory reporting regime under IFRS. In addition, since IFRS produces 
more timely and value-relevant earnings numbers, the demand for manages to provide 
supplementary information to help investors better predict future earnings could be reduced. 
Therefore, IFRS adoption may also lead to fewer management forecasts.  
We employ a difference-in-difference research design to examine the impact of 
mandatory adoption of IFRS on management earnings forecasts. Our treatment sample includes 
firms from 27 countries that mandated IFRS adoption in 2005 and our control sample includes 
firms from seven countries that did not mandate the adoption during our sample period. We 
compare the change in management forecasts issued by firms in the treatment and control 
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samples after the adoption. We document an increase in the likelihood and frequency of 
management forecast issuance following the adoption in 2005 in our treatment sample relative to 
firms in the control group, suggesting a complementary effect between IFRS adoption and 
voluntary disclosure and the confirmatory role of mandatory reporting. This increase is 
statistically significant and is robust to various model specifications addressing the concerns 
about data coverage and sample composition in the pre- and post-adoption periods.  
There is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of IFRS due to the diversity in 
countries’ institutional infrastructures. Moreover, fair value oriented rules of IFRS affect certain 
industries more than others. We exploit this cross-sectional heterogeneity to provide further 
evidence on the confirmatory role of reporting standards.2  Our first test examines the effect of 
IFRS on the disclosure levels of firms in financial industries. An important feature of IFRS is its 
“fair value” orientation given that these standards make more use of mark-to-market approaches. 
While fair value accounting is in many ways conceptually appealing, it is often difficult to 
implement and involves managerial discretion. Under this view, fair value accounting produces 
financial statements that contain higher noise and lower verifiability relative to those produced 
under “historical cost” (Watts [2003a, 2003b], Ball [2006]). The confirmatory role of reporting 
standards predicts that the level of voluntary disclosure will be lower in industries that are 
affected to a greater extent by the fair value accounting aspects of IFRS. Consistent with this 
argument, we find that the increase in management forecasts following IFRS adoption is 
significantly mitigated for firms in financial industries, whose assets and liabilities are largely 
                                                            
2 These cross-sectional tests help alleviate concerns regarding two research design choices that affect any IFRS 
study – the choice of control group and the fact that all mandatory IFRS adoptions occurred in 2005. The cross-
sectional tests we perform help rule out any alternative theories related to the weaknesses in our research design 
choice. 
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recognized based on fair value. This finding suggests that fair value accounting is likely to be an 
impediment to more voluntary disclosure.  
We next focus on differences in prior domestic GAAP and legal enforcement within the 
treatment group. If the positive impact of IFRS adoption on the information environment is 
larger in countries with bigger changes in accounting standards or stronger legal enforcement, 
then the confirmatory role of reporting standards predicts that the level of voluntary disclosure 
will be greater in these countries. Consistent with this argument, we find that the increase in 
management forecasts following IFRS adoption is larger in countries where the difference 
between a country’s prior domestic accounting standards and IFRS is bigger or legal 
enforcement, measured by the rule of law index and the European Union membership, is stronger.      
We next examine how the relation between mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure 
shapes a firm’s liquidity. Consistent with prior literature, we first document an increase in 
liquidity following IFRS adoption. More importantly, we also find that the increase in liquidity is 
stronger amongst firms that issue more management forecasts. This finding complements prior 
literature examining the economic consequences of IFRS by identifying an indirect mechanism 
through which mandatory IFRS adoption also affects capital markets.  
Our study makes three contributions. First, it adds to the literature that examines the 
interplay between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The mandatory adoption of IFRS is a 
compelling setting to examine this research question because it is an exogenously imposed event 
and is unlikely to be affected by disclosure choice.3  The large scale of adoption, i.e., many 
companies and countries adopting at the same time, and the dramatic change in financial 
                                                            
3 Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar [2012a] examine a similar research question using a sample of US public firms. 
They use the level of audit fees as a proxy for mandatory reporting quality. However, audit fees are endogenous, as 
managers may choose to commit to a higher level of reporting quality for the same reason that they increase 
disclosure. Therefore, their study likely documents an association between mandatory reporting and voluntary 
disclosure rather than a causal relationship. 
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reporting enhances the setting, as we are able to exploit the variation in differences between prior 
domestic GAAP and IFRS across countries to investigate the association between voluntary 
disclosure and changes in mandatory financial reporting. Such a setting cannot be replicated by 
studies examining the change of voluntary disclosure following changes in accounting standards 
within a single country, such as the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US in 2002. 
Without the cross-sectional variation in the degrees of changes in financial reporting, it is very 
difficult to disentangle the effect of financial reporting reform from other contemporaneous 
events that may have a direct or indirect impact on voluntary disclosure.4  In sum, the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in a group of heterogeneous countries serves as a pseudo-natural experiment 
and allows us to attempt at providing causal evidence between these two constructs.  
Second, this paper adds to the literature that examines the effects of IFRS. Thus far, this 
stream of literature has focused only on properties of mandated disclosure and has ignored the 
possible impact of the regulatory reform on voluntary disclosure. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to examine the impact of IFRS on voluntary disclosure. Further, prior 
studies generally document a positive effect of IFRS adoption on analysts’ information 
environment and capital markets (e.g., Landsman et al. [2011], Byard, Li, and Yu [2011], Tan, 
Wang, and Welker [2011]). However, our finding that voluntary disclosure increases after IFRS 
adoption suggests that the capital market effects of IFRS are partially attributable to improved 
voluntary disclosure, as it also has positive impacts on the information environment and liquidity 
(e.g., Welker [1995], Leuz and Schrand [2009], Balakrishnan et al. [2012]). Specifically, our 
                                                            
4 SOX not only imposed reforms in financial reporting but also contained provisions limiting insider trading and 
improving corporate governance, which could have direct impacts on voluntary disclosure. For example, Ball et al. 
(2012a) examine the effect of SOX on investors’ responses to management forecasts in their robustness analysis and 
find evidence consistent with the confirmatory role of mandatory financial reporting. However, they caution that the 
introduction of SOX could be endogenous to events that may affect financial reporting. Gordon et al. (2006) find 
that firms voluntarily disclose more information on security activities after SOX, but attribute this finding to the 
increased focuses on information security after SOX.  
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finding that the liquidity benefits of IFRS are greater for firms that increase their voluntarily 
disclosure levels suggests the existence of an indirect mechanism by which IFRS has impacted 
liquidity.  
Third, this paper also adds to the debate on fair value accounting (Watts [2003a], [2003b] 
Barth et al. [2008]). Recent studies examining the consequences of fair value accounting have 
focused on its effects on earnings management (Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare [2010]) and 
information risk (Riedl and Serafeim [2011]). We extend this stream of literature by examining 
the effect of fair value accounting on voluntary disclosure. The findings that the positive effect of 
IFRS adoption on voluntary disclosure is mitigated in financial industries, where firms are 
mostly likely to be influenced by fair value accounting, suggest that fair value accounting may 
also have unintended consequences on the levels of voluntary disclosure.   
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the relevant 
literature and discusses our hypothesis development and empirical predictions. Section 3 
describes the empirical research design. Section 4 discusses our data, sample and results, 
including a number of sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
The relation between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures can be considered as complements. Gigler and Hemmer 
[1998] show how mandatory reporting complements voluntarily disclosing private information, 
by playing a confirmatory role in an agency setting where voluntary disclosures are motivated by 
the desire to achieve efficient contracting. The firm releases earnings reports at varying 
mandated intervals, but voluntary disclosures are more informative about “true” earnings in their 
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setting because they are based on managers’ private information. They find that increased 
mandatory reporting results in more informative voluntary disclosures by managers. Stocken 
[2000] argues that in the absence of a mechanism to enforce verifiability, voluntary disclosures 
are not credible and therefore are ignored by the market. However, accounting reports that verify 
information in managers’ voluntary disclosures make these disclosures credible and thus 
informative in equilibrium. In a similar vein, Lundholm [2003] argues that even though the 
mandatory report is backward-looking and therefore has no informational content, it improves 
the credibility of voluntary disclosure. Ball [2006] argues that when managers believe 
accounting numbers are more likely to be reported accurately and independently (mandatory 
reporting), they are less likely to disclose misleading information about their expectations 
(voluntary disclosure). LaFond and Watts [2008] argue that verifiable “hard” information on 
current performance provides a benchmark that makes it possible for alternative “soft” sources to 
generate credible information on unverifiable gains. Recent empirical work has aimed at testing 
this complementary effect. For example, Ball et al. [2012a] find that firms that commit to higher 
audit fees (a measure of financial statement verification) is associated with management 
forecasts that are more frequent, specific, timely, accurate and informative to investors.  
We use the mandatory adoption of IFRS as an exogenous improvement in the quality of 
mandatory reporting. The stated objective of IFRS and the predecessor set of standards, 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), is to produce “high quality” financial statements, such 
as reflecting economic substance more than legal form, reflecting economic gains and losses in a 
more timely fashion, and making earnings more informative (Ball [2006]). Consistent with this 
objective, Barth et al. [2008] find that firms applying IAS have higher accounting quality, 
evidenced by less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and more value-relevant 
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accounting numbers. Landsman et al. [2011] find that the information content of earnings 
announcements increases following the mandatory adoption of IFRS due to reduced reporting lag, 
increased analyst following, and increased foreign investment. Collectively, these studies along 
with the aforementioned theory predict voluntary disclosure to increase following the adoption of 
IFRS.  
On the other hand, mandatory and voluntary disclosures could also be substitutes. The 
extant voluntary disclosure models capture the effect of changes in mandatory disclosure on the 
voluntary disclosure of a private signal as changes in a firm’s information environment. 5  
Specifically, an increase in mandatory disclosure is generally interpreted as either a decrease in 
the market’s prior variance of the firm’s liquidation value or as the release of an additional signal 
correlated with the firm’s liquidation value (Verrecchia [1983], [1990]). This literature suggests 
that an increase in mandatory disclosure leads to a decrease in voluntary disclosure, as private 
information that was previously conveyed through voluntary disclosure is now directly reflected 
in mandatory financial reports. In other words, given a fixed amount of information that 
managers are willing to disclose, when more is disclosed in mandatory reporting, less is left for 
voluntary disclosure.  
Compared to prior domestic accounting standards, IFRS has more extensive disclosure 
requirements. For example, IFRS has detailed rules on measurement and recognition of financial 
assets and liabilities and employee benefits, and extensive disclosure requirements on related 
party transactions, segment information, and cash flow statements, while they are often absent in 
many countries’ domestic accounting standards (e.g., Bae, Tan, and Welker [2008], Nobes 
[2001]).  As a result, disclosures that were previously classified as voluntary may now fall into 
the mandatory reporting regime under IFRS. In addition, since IFRS produces more timely and 
                                                            
5 See Verrecchia [2001] for a survey of these models. 
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value-relevant earnings numbers, the demand for managers to provide supplementary 
information to help investors better predict future earnings may be reduced. For example, Byard 
et al.’s [2011] finding that analyst estimates become more accurate following IFRS adoption 
implies that there might be less demand for management earnings forecasts from analysts (Cotter, 
Tuna, and Wysocki [2006]). As a result, we may observe a decrease in voluntary disclosure 
following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
In sum, the relation between voluntary disclosure and IFRS is an empirical question. We 
state our first hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis H1: Complementary effect (Substitution effect): Voluntary disclosure 
increases (decreases) following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
Besides producing high quality financial statements, a major feature of IFRS is “fair 
value” or “mark-to-market” accounting (Ball [2006]). The fair value orientation of IFRS is most 
represented by its measurement and recognition rules on financial assets and liabilities, which are 
often absent in adopting countries’ prior domestic GAAP (e.g., Nobes [2001], Bae et al. [2008]).6  
Under IAS 39, financial instruments other than loans and receivables that are not held for trading, 
securities held to maturity, and qualifying hedges (which must be near perfect to qualify) are 
required to be recognized at their fair value.7 However, the fair value of financial instruments is 
often harder to ascertain. Ball [2006] argues that when liquid market prices of financial assets 
and liabilities are not available, fair value accounting becomes “mark to model” accounting, 
under which firms report estimates of market prices, not actual arm’s length market prices. This 
                                                            
6 In addition, IFRS also gives firms an option to choose the revaluation model and measure their property, plant, and 
equipments, intangible assets, and investment properties at their fair value (IAS 16, 38, and 40). However, 
Christensen and Nikolaev [2012] find that although IFRS gives firms the choice to use fair value accounting, the 
majority of firms still choose historical accounting to evaluate their non-financial assets.  
7 In fact, due to its large impact on financial statements of firms in financial industries, the adoption of IAS 39 has 
been controversial. See Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer and Riedl [2010] for detailed discussions on the debate of IAS 
39. 
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introduces “model noise”, due to imperfect pricing models and imperfect estimates of model 
parameters. This also increases opportunities for manipulation, as managers can influence both 
the choice of models and the parameter estimates. Even when liquid market prices are available, 
managers can influence traded as well as quoted prices, and hence be able to manipulate fair 
value estimates. As a result, the process of determining the correct fair value unavoidably 
introduces noise to accounting numbers and opens opportunities for managerial manipulation, 
which makes financial statements prepared under IFRS less independent and less verifiable 
relative to “historical-cost” oriented domestic GAAP. As argued above, an important role of 
financial statements is to provide verifiable information to investors and therefore enhance the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure. When information contained in financial statements become 
noisy and difficulty to verify, voluntary disclosure loses its credibility among investors. 
Consistent with this view, Ball et al. [2012b] document that the usage of mark-to-market 
accounting in securities reduces the likelihood of banks issuing management earnings forecasts, 
as reported earnings provide a noisier confirmation of the truthfulness of bank managers’ 
disclosures of private information via earnings forecasts and lessen their credibility among 
investors.  
Therefore, we expect the fair value orientation of IFRS to adversely affect managers’ 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosure, and this adverse effect is most likely to be present in 
financial industries where firms have a large possession of financial assets and liabilities to be 
recognized at fair value.  
Hypothesis H2: The increase (decrease) in voluntary disclosure following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS is weaker (stronger) in financial industries. 
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Although all the countries in our treatment sample mandated IFRS at the same time, it is 
unlikely that the adoption has uniform effects on voluntary disclosure across different sample 
countries. First, prior to IFRS adoption, each country has drastically different local accounting 
standards. The change in financial reporting is likely to be small if a country’s prior domestic 
accounting standards were similar to IFRS. Second, due to differences in enforcement strength 
and the legal environment, the implementation of IFRS is likely to differ across different sample 
countries, which may lead to different financial reporting practices even under the same set of 
accounting standards. Consistent with this view, several prior studies document differential 
effects of IFRS on capital markets and information environment across different countries. For 
example, Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi  [2008] find that the capital-market benefits of IFRS only 
exist in countries with strong enforcement; Byard et al. [2011] find that IFRS adoption only 
improves analysts’ information environment in countries with both strong enforcement regimes 
and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS; Landsman et al. [2012] 
find that the improvement in the information content of earnings after IFRS adoption is larger in 
countries with strong legal enforcement. Following prior literature, we expect the following 
differential effects of IFRS on voluntary disclosure: 
Hypothesis H3: The complementary effect (substitution effect) between voluntary 
disclosure and mandatory adoption of IFRS is stronger in countries with large local 
GAAP-IFRS difference or strong legal enforcement. 
 
3. Research Design 
We use the mandatory adoption of IFRS as an exogenous change to mandatory reporting 
and employ a difference-in-difference method to evaluate its average effect on voluntary 
disclosure. Our basic research design entails estimating the following equation:                  
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, , 1 , , , ,i j t t j t i j t i tj jDISC Post IFRS X                           (1) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes countries and t indexes year, DISC is the dependent variable of 
interest and represents a measure of voluntary disclosure, α is the country fixed effect, λ is the 
year fixed effect, Post is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for fiscal years ending in 
or after December 2005, IFRS is an indicator variable that takes a value of one for countries that 
mandated IFRS in 2005 (treatment sample), and X is a vector of control variables. β1 measures 
the impact of IFRS adoption on the dependent variable DISC in the treatment sample relative to 
the control group. We use two variables – Issue and Freq to measure the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Issue is a dummy variable defined as one if a firm issues at least one management 
earnings forecast in a given year. Freq is a count variable measuring the total number of 
management forecasts that a firm issues during a year. Both Issue and Freq are set to zero for 
firm-years without any management forecasts. A complementary (substitution) effect between 
IFRS adoption and voluntary disclosure predicts a positive (negative) β1. We include country and 
year fixed effects to control for potential country-specific and year-specific factors that may 
affect voluntary disclosure. This model does not include the main effect variables, IFRS and Post, 
as they are absorbed by the country and year fixed effects. We also control for various firm-level 
variables that might potentially influence firms’ voluntary disclosure, including firm size (the 
natural logarithm of market value of equity, return on assets (net income divided by total assets), 
market-to-book ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of equity), leverage (long-
term debt divided by total assets), earnings volatility (standard deviation of earnings divided by 
total assets for the past five years, a minimum of three years’ data required), and stock return 
volatility (standard deviation of annual buy-and-hold stock returns over the past five years, a 
minimum of three years’ data required). Firm size is generally positively associated with 
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management forecasts, as the costs of issuing forecasts are lower for big firms. The association 
between management forecasts and the market-to-book ratio, earnings volatility, and stock return 
volatility is ambiguous. On the one hand, due to forecasting difficulty, firms with higher growth 
rates or higher volatility may issue fewer management forecasts. On the other hand, since high-
growth and more volatile firms often face higher information asymmetry, investors may demand 
more voluntary disclosures from their managers.  
We use the following equation to test H2:                      
, , 1 2 , , 3 , ,
, , , ,
i j t t j i j t i j t t j
t i j t i j tj
DISC Post IFRS Financial Financial Post IFRS
X
  
   
     
                 (2) 
where Financial is defined as one for firms in financial industries (with SIC between 6000 and 
6999). The above model is essentially Equation (1) by allowing β1 to vary cross firms. H2 
suggests that the fair value component of IFRS should reduce voluntary disclosure. Therefore, 
we predict β3 to be negative. We do not provide any predictions on β2, as there is no prior theory 
suggesting whether firms in financial industries should issue more or fewer management 
forecasts. The control variables are defined in the same way as those in Equation (1).  
We use the following equation to test H3: 
, , 1 , , , ,i j t t j t i j t i jj tDISC Post Conditioning X                                               (3) 
where Conditioning is a country-level measure for local GAAP-IFRS differences or the strength 
of legal enforcement. As we are only interested in the differential treatment effect among 
countries adopting IFRS, Equation (3) is estimated for the treatment sample only. β1 also 
captures the difference-in-difference effect, as countries in the treatment sample with low values 
of conditioning variables are used as the benchmark. This model does not include the main effect 
variables, Conditioning and Post, as they are absorbed by the country and year fixed effects. H3 
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suggests that the complementary (substitution) effect between of IFRS and management 
forecasts as documented in Equation (1) is larger in countries with larger local GAAP-IFRS 
differences or stronger legal enforcement. Therefore, we expect the sign of β1 to be the same as 
that in Equation (1). The control variables are defined in the same way as those in Equations (1) 
and (2). 
Following Bae et al. [2008], we use their gaapdiff1 score to measure the distance between 
domestic GAAP and IFRS. This score is constructed by examining a list of 21 key accounting 
items based on the Nobes [2001] GAAP Survey. It is assigned a score of 1 for each item that 
does not conform to IFRS. The variable gaapdiff1 is the aggregate score, with a higher value 
indicating a larger difference between prior domestic GAAP and IFRS. This measure is denoted 
as BaeScore and is reported in Table 1 for each country in our treatment sample and ranges from 
0 (South Africa) to 18 (Luxembourg).  
Following prior literature, we use the rule of law index (Law) of 2005 obtained from 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2009] to measure the strength of a country’s legal 
enforcement. It is reported in Table 1 for each of our treatment countries and ranges from -1.3 to 
1.9. During the mandatory adoption period, there were several concurrent changes in reporting 
enforcement within the European Union. Daske et al. [2008] and Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
[2012] find that the capital market effects of IFRS are stronger for countries within the European 
Union and attribute this finding to their concurrent efforts to improve governance and 
enforcement. Following their approach, we use an indicator for European Union membership 
(EU) as an alternative measure for strong enforcement.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
We start our sample selection process by obtaining data for management earnings 
forecasts between 2002 and 2010 from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ. Capital IQ started 
collecting information on corporate guidance in text format from January 2002 for firms across 
90 countries using various public sources, including press releases and articles from more than 
20,000 news wires and publications, regulatory files, company websites, web agents, conference 
call transcripts, and investor conference organizer websites. Capital IQ also provides information 
on company identifiers, forecast headlines, news sources, and forecasting dates in a machine-
readable format.  
Next, we obtain accounting and stock price data from Compustat Global. We keep the 
sample period between 2001 and 2009, as we use firm characteristics one year prior to the 
forecasting date as controls. We include countries that require IFRS adoption in 2005 as the 
treatment sample. We also include countries that retained domestic accounting standards during 
the entire sample period as the control sample.8  We exclude Japan and China from our control 
group, as management forecasts are fully mandated in Japan (Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura 
[2009]) and are partially mandated in China (Huang, Li, Tse, and Tucker [2012]).9  In addition, 
as IFRS or IAS is allowed but not mandated in some of the countries in our control group, we 
exclude firm-years from the control sample if IFRS or IAS is voluntarily used to prepare 
financial statements. We also exclude firm-years in the treatment countries that did not use IFRS 
for fiscal years ending in or after December 2005 or did not use local accounting standards 
                                                            
8 We exclude the US from our control sample because it would dominate the sample in terms of observations.  
9 For example, since 2000, firms listed in Chinese stock exchanges have been required to issue loss warnings. Since 
2001, firms have been required to issue earnings forecasts if earnings are expected to change more than 50%. Since 
2004, firms turning profit from loss also need to issue forecasts. 
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before the adoption date.10  To create a clean sample of global firms, we remove those that have 
public debt, equity or ADRs traded in the US. We delete firm-years that do not disclose the 
accounting standards used to prepare their financial statements and that do not have enough data 
to calculate the variables used in our regressions. This selection process generates 32,116 firm-
year observations, including 25,791 firm-years from 27 countries in the treatment sample and 
6,325 firm-years from seven countries in the control sample. As accounting and stock price data 
from different countries are often denominated in local currencies, to increase comparability, we 
convert all non-ratio variables into US dollars using the exchange rate at the fiscal year end.  
 We merge management forecast data from Capital IQ with the firm-level data from 
Compustat Global using Gvkey and the calendar year of forecasting date. To mitigate the 
potential impact of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99%.  
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by country and year. Large economies, such as 
United Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany dominate the treatment sample, while Canada, 
Thailand, and India take up the majority of the control group. Table 2 Panel A reports the 
average number of management forecasts (Freq) issued by firms in the pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption periods for each sample country. We observe an increase in forecasting frequency in all 
treatment countries in the post-adoption period. Forecasting frequency also increased for all the 
control countries. The observed increase in forecasting frequency in both treatment and control 
samples could be a result of the increasing popularity of management guidance around the world 
and/or improved coverage by Capital IQ. 11  Table 2 Panel B reports summary statistics of 
regression variables in the pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods for the treatment and control 
                                                            
10 Firms in our treatment countries that do not use IFRS after the mandatory adoption date might be those being 
exempted from mandatory adoption. For example, in certain countries firms may be allowed to follow US GAAP for 
financial reporting. These observations are removed in our analysis to create a cleaner comparison between local 
GAAP in the pre-adoption period and IFRS in the post-adoption period.  
11 We address the issue of Capital IQ coverage in our robustness analyses in Section 4.3. 
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samples separately, along with differences in means between pre- and post-IFRS adoption. For 
firms in our treatment sample, 46.8% firms issued management forecasts in the post-adoption 
period relative to 11.9% in the pre-adoption period, and the average forecast frequency also 
increased by 0.762 post-adoption. Both of these increases are statistically significant. For firms 
in the control group, only 14% more firms issued forecasts in the post-adoption period and the 
average forecast frequency only increased by 0.182. The last two columns report the mean 
difference-in-difference and t statistics. Both Issue and Freq have positive and significant 
difference-in-difference means, suggesting that the increase of management forecasts after IFRS 
adoption is larger for firms in our treatment group relative to those in the control group. This 
table also suggests that firms in our treatment sample experience larger increases in firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, and leverage in the post-adoption period relative to the control group, 
which may partially explain the increase in management forecasts. In addition, we also observe 
an increase in liquidity post-adoption, consistent with the findings in Daske et al. [2008]. 
 
4.2 Effect of IFRS on Management Forecasts 
A. Baseline analysis 
Table 3 presents the difference-in-difference regression results for Equation (1). We 
report the regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for firm-level 
clustering.12 In the first two columns, we use a Poisson model to investigate whether firms 
change their forecasting frequency after IFRS adoption.13  Consistent with the complementary 
effect in H1, the coefficients on PostIFRS are positive and significant at 1% level in models 
with or without controls for firm characteristics. Therefore, a coefficient of 0.4444 in Column (2) 
                                                            
12 We get qualitatively similar results if we cluster standard errors by country. 
13 We use a Poisson model because our dependent variable is a count variable. Our conclusions remain unchanged if 
we use OLS. 
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implies a marginal effect of 0.2039, i.e. the average increase in forecasting frequency in the post-
adoption period for an IFRS-adopting firm is 0.2 higher than that for a non-IFRS firm. We report 
a Pseudo R-square of 0.228, suggesting that our model explains about 22.8% of the variation in 
forecasting frequency. In the last two columns, we use a Logit model to investigate whether 
firms’ propensity to issue forecasts changes after adopting IFRS. A positive and significant 
coefficient of 0.5146 on PostIFRS suggests that IFRS firms are 10.85% more likely to issue 
management forecasts relative to non-IFRS firms after the adoption. Combined together, these 
results suggest that both the frequency and likelihood of management forecasts increase 
significantly following IFRS adoption. 
In terms of the control variables, we find that larger firms issue more forecasts, 
potentially due to lower costs associated with forecasting. Positive coefficients on ROA suggest 
that well-performing firms are more willing to voluntarily disclose future earnings. Positive 
coefficients on return volatility indicate that firms may issue more voluntary disclosure to reduce 
high uncertainty for future prospects.   
 
B. Analysis on fair value component of IFRS 
Table 4 presents the regression results for Equation (2). As above, we use a Poisson 
model for the regressions on Freq and a Logit model for regressions on Issue. Consistent with 
the argument in H2 that fair value accounting is an impediment for more voluntary disclosure, 
we find the coefficients on PostIFRSFinancial to be negative and significant at the 1% level 
in all model specifications. Consistent with our findings in Table 3, we continue to document 
positive and significant coefficients on PostIFRS and the magnitudes are larger than the 
magnitudes of those on PostIFRSFinancial. Taken together, these results suggest that 
19 
 
although the positive effect of IFRS on management forecasts is significantly lower for firms in 
financial industries potentially due to the impact of fair value accounting, the positive effect still 
outweighs the negative effect. The coefficients on the control variables and the reported R-
squares are largely comparable to those reported in Table 3.  
 
C. Cross-sectional analysis on GAAP difference and legal enforcement  
Table 5 reports the regression results for Equation (3) using observations only from the 
treatment sample. As above, we use a Poisson model for the regressions on Freq and a Logit 
model for regressions on Issue. Consistent with the argument in H3 that the effect of IFRS on 
management forecasts is stronger in countries where the difference between prior local GAAP 
and IFRS is larger, we document positive and significant coefficients on Post×BaeScore in both 
regressions. Similarly, positive coefficients on Post×Law and Post×EU suggest that the positive 
effect of IFRS on management forecasts is more pronounced in countries with strong legal 
enforcement. These results mitigate the concern that the observed changes in management 
forecasting behavior are due to alternative events that occurred concurrent to IFRS. Any omitted 
alternative event is unlikely to generate a similar cross-sectional variation in the treatment effect. 
The coefficients on the control variables and the reported R-squares are largely 
comparable to those reported in Tables 3 and 4, suggesting that the association between firm 
characteristics and management forecasts is similar across our treatment and control samples. 
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
A. Litigation risk 
 Prior literature suggests that litigation risk is a determinant of voluntary disclosure. For 
example, Skinner (1994) finds that firms voluntarily issue management forecasts, especially 
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those containing bad news, to avoid potential shareholder lawsuits. Given that litigation risk may 
also be positively associated with mandatory disclosure quality, it could be a correlated omitted 
variable in the documented positive association between mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
(Ball et al. [2012a]). Although this is less of a concern in our setting because IFRS is an 
exogenously imposed reform that improves mandatory reporting and we use a difference-in-
difference model, there is a possibility that firms may face higher litigation risk following IFRS 
adoption due to concurrent changes in enforcement (Christensen et al. [2012]). 
 Following prior literature, we identify firms that face high litigation risk and estimate the 
following model: 
, , 1 2 , , 3 , ,
, , , ,
i j t t j i j t i j t t j
t i j t i j tj
DISC Post IFRS Litigation Litigation Post IFRS
X
  
   
     
           (4) 
where Litigation is a dummy variable that is defined as one for firms from regulated industries 
(SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374 and 8731-8734), and zero 
otherwise. We expect β2 to be positive and significant, as firms facing higher litigation risk are 
more likely to issue management forecasts. We do not have any predictions on the sign of β3. On 
one hand, the difference in litigation risk faced by firms in regulated industries and unregulated 
industries might be reduced due to elevated enforcement across all industries after IFRS adoption, 
which predicts a negative sign of β3. On the other hand, regulated industries might be more 
affected by strengthened enforcement following IFRS adoption, which would predict a positive 
sign on β3. Regardless of the sign of β3, if IFRS adoption results in more management forecasts, 
we expect β2+ β3 to be positive. The results as reported in Table 6 Panel A are consistent with 
this expectation and suggest that our findings in Table 3 are unlikely to be driven by litigation 
risk being a correlated omitted variable. In addition, the negative coefficients on 
PostIFRSLitigation suggest that litigation risk becomes a less important determinant of 
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management forecasts following IFRS adoption, potentially due to elevated enforcement across 
all industries. 
B. Capital IQ coverage 
 A common concern about databases that provide machine-readable information for 
management forecasts is their completeness and biases in coverage. For example, by comparing 
management forecasts provided by Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance database 
with a random sample of management forecasts hand-collected from newswires, Chuk, 
Matsumoto, and Miller [2012] find that the former tends to cover large firms with high analyst 
following and high institutional ownership and that the coverage is more complete after 1997. 
Although Capital IQ uses a different data collection process from First Call, it might not be 
immune from this criticism.14  In particular, we cannot distinguish when a firm did not issue any 
management forecasts in a certain year from when the firm was not covered by Capital IQ in that 
particular year. As a result, our finding that management forecasts increased following IFRS 
adoption could be driven by Capital IQ’s expanded coverage over time. Although our difference-
in-difference research design already takes into account any systematic time trends existing in 
the data, one may argue that the coverage expansion might be more in favor of the treatment 
sample which includes some small economies. If this were the case, having a control group 
would not entirely control for such a bias. We conduct four robustness tests to address this 
concern. First, we remove countries with less than 100 observations from the sample. By doing 
so, we mitigate the concern that our results are driven by a bias in Capital IQ’s coverage 
expansion towards small economies. Second, we repeat the analysis on Freq after removing all 
non-forecasters from the sample. In other words, we only keep firm-years that have at least one 
                                                            
14 Capital IQ simply provides all management forecasts in text format and does not code the content of forecasts. 
Therefore, the bias in First Call that quantitative and bad news forecasts are more likely to be covered (Chuk et al.  
[2012])  is unlikely to apply to Capital IQ. 
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management forecast. Freq, therefore, is measuring how often a firm updates its management 
forecasts conditioning on the firm being a forecaster covered by Capital IQ. Third, we limit our 
sample period to 2004-2010, as Radhakrishnan et al. (2012) suggest that the coverage of Capital 
IQ is likely to be more complete after 2004. Fourth, we remove countries that did not have any 
forecasters in the pre-adoption period. This approach mitigates the concern that Capital IQ only 
started covering certain sample countries in the post-adoption period. The robustness regression 
results are reported in Table 6 Panel B (Criteria 1 to 4). Although the coefficients on PostIFRS 
are smaller in certain sample specifications compared to those reported in Table 3, they continue 
to be positive and significant at the 1% level throughout all regressions. Therefore, we take 
comfort that our main finding that management forecasts increased after IFRS adoption is 
unlikely to be driven by potential coverage biases existing in Capital IQ. 
C. Sample composition 
One may argue that due to firms being added to or dropping out of the dataset at different 
points in time, sample composition in the pre-IFRS adoption period might be different from that 
in the post-adoption period. To address this issue, we create a constant sample by requiring each 
firm to exist in both pre- and post-adoption periods. The results as reported in the last two 
columns of Table 6 Panel B are very similar to those reported in Table 3, suggesting that our 
finding is unlikely to be driven by differences in sample composition. 
 
4.4 Effect of IFRS and Management Forecasts on Liquidity 
Our main analysis above provides evidence consistent with the complementary effect of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Specifically, we find that mandatory adoption of IFRS 
leads to an increase in management forecasts. Next, we examine the effect of this relation on 
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liquidity. This analysis serves two purposes. First, if the increase in the quality of financial 
standards improves the reliability of voluntary disclosures as per the confirmatory role of 
mandatory financial reporting, one should observe a greater level of liquidity associated with 
voluntary disclosures post-IFRS adoption. Second, the capital market effect of IFRS has been 
heavily debated on. Early evidence suggests positive capital market effects around the worldwide 
introduction of IFRS (e.g., Daske et al. [2008], Armstrong et al. [2010]. Byard et al. [2011], Tan, 
Wang, and Welker [2011]). However, subsequent studies have cautioned that the capital market 
benefits of IFRS may have been overstated in prior literature (see Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki [2010] 
for a survey). For example, Daske et al. [2008] show that market liquidity increases only in 
countries with strong legal enforcement. In a similar vein, Christensen et al. [2012] argue that the 
observed capital market effects of IFRS may be wholly attributable to concurrent enforcement 
changes. Thus, examining liquidity effects conditional on voluntary disclosure furthers our 
understanding of the mechanism through which mandatory IFRS adoption affects capital markets. 
In order to examine the liquidity effects, we use the following regression specification: 
, , 1 2 , , , ,
, , ,
3
, 
i j t i j i j t i j i j t
t i j t i j tj
Illiq Post IFRS DISC Post IFRS DISC
X
  
   
     
                             (5) 
where Illiq is an inverse measure for liquidity and it is based on a factor score extracted from 
three liquidity variables using factor analysis: zero returns, price impact, and bid-ask spreads.15 
We also employ a decile rank transformation of the common factor, Rank_Illiq. Illiq and 
Rank_Illiq are measured as of month +7 after the fiscal year-end. These variables are coded such 
                                                            
15 Zero returns is the fraction of trading days with zero returns in a quarter. Following Lesmond, Ogden, and 
Trzcinka [1999] and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka [2009], we use daily CRPS data (CRSP variables ret and vol) 
to calculate the fraction of trading days with positive trading volume (vol > 0) and zero returns (ret = 0) during the 
month.  Price impact is the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure. We use daily CRSP data (CRSP variables ret, prc, 
and vol) to calculate the ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume [1,000,000×|ret|(|prc|×vol)] for each day in 
the month. To construct the bid-ask spreads, we use daily closing bid and ask data from CRSP (CRSP variables ask 
and bid) to calculate 100×(ask–bid)/[(ask+bid)/2]. We then average these daily bid-ask spreads over the month. 
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that higher values imply lower liquidity. All other variables are as defined above. Following 
prior literature that examines liquidity, we control for various firm-level variables that might 
potentially influence liquidity, including firm size (Size), stock return volatility (RetVol) and 
trading volume (Turnover). Further, given prior evidence that the capital-market effects are 
concentrated in member states of the European Union (EU) we restrict our treatment sample to 
firms in these states (Daske et al. [2008]).  
Table 7 presents the results of our liquidity analysis. First, we note that the coefficients 
on Post×IFRS are negative and significant across all model specifications. This result is 
consistent with evidence in prior literature that mandatory IFRS adoption resulted in increased 
liquidity for EU firms. More importantly, we find that the coefficients on Post×IFRS×Freq and 
Post×IFRS×Issue are negative and significant. Thus, firms which increased voluntary disclosure 
post-IFRS experienced a greater increase in liquidity and that the increase in liquidity is 
proportional to the increase in the level of voluntary disclosure. The findings in this table suggest 
that the increase in the quality of financial standards improves the reliability of voluntary 
disclosures. Further, at least some of the post-IFRS liquidity benefits documented in prior 
literature is attributable to increased voluntary disclosure as a result of the confirmatory role of 
IFRS.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Mandated financial reporting and voluntary disclosure are two important channels of 
corporate disclosure by which managers communicate private information with capital markets. 
Yet, the interplay between these channels has not been well understood. On the one hand, 
mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure can be complements, as the former 
produces verifiable information that improves the credibility of the latter and therefore 
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encourages managers to issue more forecasts. On the other hand, the two constructs can be 
substitutes wherein voluntary disclosure supplements inadequacies in the information 
communicated through mandatory reporting. Thus, the relation between these two channels is 
largely an empirical question. 
Using mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 across 27 countries as an exogenous 
improvement of mandatory financial reporting quality, we document an increase in the 
likelihood and frequency of management forecast issuance relative to firms in non-IFRS 
adopting countries. This increase is both statistically and economically significant and is robust 
to various model specifications addressing the concerns about differences in data coverage and 
sample composition in the pre- and post-adoption periods. We also find that the increase in 
management forecasts following IFRS adoption is larger in countries where the difference 
between a country’s prior domestic accounting standards and IFRS is bigger or legal 
enforcement is stronger. These findings suggest a confirmatory role of IFRS. 
A key feature of IFRS is fair value accounting, which could potentially reduce the 
confirmatory effect of financial statements prepared under IFRS and be an impediment to more 
voluntary disclosure. Consistent with this view, we find that firms in financial industries, which 
are most likely to be affected by fair value rules, exhibit a lower increase in management 
forecasts following IFRS adoption.  
Finally, we examine the liquidity effects of IFRS adoption and management forecasts. 
Consistent with prior studies, we document an increase in liquidity following IFRS. More 
importantly, we document that the increase in liquidity is much larger for firms with more 
management forecasts. This finding complements prior literature by establishing an alternate 
mechanism through which mandatory IFRS adoption affects capital markets. 
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Table 1 Panel A: Sample Composition and Institutional Variables by Country  
        
Country N       
 IFRS countries (Treatment sample N=25,791) 
    
Difference 
between Local 
GAAP and IFRS  
Legal 
Enforcement  
Membership in 
the European 
Union  
Australia 3,014 4 1.7 No 
Austria 361 12 1.8 Yes 
Belgium 568 13 1.4 Yes 
Czech Republic 50 14 0.7 Yes 
Denmark 948 11 1.9 Yes 
Finland 930 15 1.9 Yes 
France 2,309 12 1.3 Yes 
Germany 2,564 11 1.7 Yes 
Greece 453 17 0.7 Yes 
Hong Kong 794 3 1.5 No 
Hungary 80 13 0.7 Yes 
Iceland 34 N.A. N.A. No 
Ireland 202 1 1.6 Yes 
Italy 1,256 12 0.5 Yes 
Lativa 67 N.A. N.A. Yes 
Luxembourg 25 18 1.9 Yes 
Netherlands 603 4 1.7 Yes 
Norway 675 7 1.9 No 
Philippines 324 10 -0.4 No 
Poland 701 12 0.3 Yes 
Portugal 220 13 1.1 Yes 
Slovenia 115 9 N.A. Yes 
Spain 626 16 1.1 Yes 
South Africa 1,260 0 0.2 No 
Sweden 1,023 10 1.8 Yes 
Switzerland 827 12 2 No 
United Kingdom 5,762 1 1.6 Yes 
Non-IFRS countries (Control sample N=6,325) 
Brazil 235 N.A. N.A. No 
Canada 2,321 N.A. N.A. No 
India 1,316 N.A. N.A. No 
Indonesia 816 N.A. N.A. No 
Mexico 108 N.A. N.A. No 
Taiwan 693 N.A. N.A. No 
Thailand 836 N.A. N.A. No 
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The treatment sample includes 25,791 firm-years from countries that mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. 
The control sample includes 6,325 firm-years from countries that do not require IFRS reporting during our sample 
period. Panel A reports the number of firm-years by country and the institutional variables for the treatment group. 
Difference between Local GAAP and IFRS is based on the Bae et al. (2008) summary score gaafdiff1of how 
domestic GAAP differs from IAS on 21 key accounting dimensions. Legal Enforcement is based on the rule of law 
variable for the year 2005 from Kaufmann et al. (2009). We also indicate whether a country is a member of the 
European Union (EU). Panel B reports the number of firm-years in the treatment and control samples by year. 
 
 
Table 1 Panel B: Sample Composition by Year 
      
Year N         
IFRS countries 
2002 2,250     
2003 2,455     
2004 2,552     
2005 2,867     
2006 2,556     
2007 2,735     
2008 3,021     
2009 3,628     
2010 3,727     
Total 25,791     
Non-IFRS countries 
2002 357     
2003 455     
2004 475     
2005 623     
2006 723     
2007 816     
2008 909     
2009 1,000     
2010 967     
Total 6,325         
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Table 2 Panel A: Management Forecast Frequency Before and After IFRS Adoption by Country 
     
Pre-IFRS adoption (Post=0)   Post-IFRS adoption (Post=1) 
IFRS countries 
Australia 0.3553  Australia 1.3683
Austria 0.0263  Austria 1.4149
Belgium 0.1104  Belgium 0.8333
Czech Republic 0.0419  Czech Republic 0.7848
Denmark 0.1596  Denmark 2.2760
Finland 0.2000  Finland 1.8415
France 0.0975  France 0.8187
Germany 0.1043  Germany 1.6519
Greece 0.0541  Greece 0.4474
Hong Kong 0.0173  Hong Kong 0.4273
Hungary 0.1429  Hungary 0.9726
Iceland 0.0000  Iceland 0.7308
Ireland 0.0882  Ireland 1.3433
Italy 0.1168  Italy 0.6926
Lativa 0.0000  Lativa 0.6379
Luxembourg 0.3333  Luxembourg 1.5263
Netherlands 0.2183  Netherlands 1.1305
Norway 0.0414  Norway 0.3656
Philippines 0.0873  Philippines 0.6667
Poland 0.1061  Poland 0.5528
Portugal 0.0159  Portugal 0.5478
Slovenia 0.0345  Slovenia 1.1395
South Africa 0.1625  South Africa 0.2977
Spain 0.1852  Spain 0.5721
Sweden 0.0703  Sweden 0.5330
Switzerland 0.0000  Switzerland 1.3182
United Kingdom 0.1306  United Kingdom 0.5168
Non-IFRS countries 
Brazil 0.0200  Brazil 0.2270
Canada 0.3281  Canada 0.5420
India 0.1202  India 0.2964
Indonesia 0.1359  Indonesia 0.4803
Mexico 0.0645  Mexico 0.4805
Taiwan 0.3117  Taiwan 0.3135
Thailand 0.2727   Thailand 0.4296
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Table 2 Panel B: Descriptive Statistics              
                 
  Pre-IFRS adoption (Post=0) Post-IFRS adoption (Post=1) Difference  (Post-Pre) 
Diff-in-diff  
(IFRS-Non-
IFRS) 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev N Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Std 
Dev Mean t Mean t 
IFRS countries (treatment sample, i.e. IFRS=1) 
Freq 8399 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.520 17392 0.927 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.320 0.762 66.21 0.580 22.56 
Issue 8399 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.324 17392 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 0.349 67.30 0.209 17.00 
Size 8399 4.713 3.320 4.665 6.045 1.935 17392 5.416 3.954 5.353 6.837 1.996 0.703 27.06 0.329 4.86 
ROA 8399 0.065 0.032 0.093 0.149 0.238 17392 0.081 0.042 0.093 0.145 0.180 0.016 5.29 0.007 1.30 
MTB 8399 2.134 0.861 1.409 2.418 2.396 17392 2.328 0.958 1.618 2.783 2.402 0.195 6.12 0.253 2.79 
Leverage 8399 0.201 0.038 0.178 0.318 0.175 17392 0.214 0.051 0.190 0.330 0.181 0.013 5.51 0.017 2.70 
EarnVol 8399 0.138 0.015 0.036 0.097 0.839 17392 0.135 0.016 0.036 0.082 2.286 -0.004 -0.18 0.010 0.51 
Ln(RetVol) 8399 -2.176 -2.564 -2.213 -1.818 0.576 17392 -2.209 -2.593 -2.220 -1.847 0.557 -0.033 -4.31 0.015 0.82 
ILLIQ 4222 0.434 -0.234 0.351 1.073 0.874 11880 0.076 -0.616 -0.039 0.585 0.898 -0.358 -22.71 -0.161 -4.58 
Non-IFRS countries(control sample, i.e. IFRS=0) 
Freq 1459 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.750 4866 0.426 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.837 0.182 7.90   
Issue 1459 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.348 4866 0.280 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.449 0.140 12.52   
Size 1459 4.819 3.353 4.561 6.186 2.127 4866 5.194 3.741 5.089 6.582 1.976 0.374 5.99   
ROA 1459 0.097 0.051 0.105 0.163 0.170 4866 0.105 0.057 0.107 0.166 0.148 0.008 1.64   
MTB 1459 2.237 0.823 1.397 2.367 2.946 4866 2.179 0.855 1.440 2.429 2.503 -0.058 -0.69   
Leverage 1459 0.236 0.053 0.207 0.362 0.200 4866 0.232 0.055 0.210 0.371 0.191 -0.004 -0.71   
EarnVol 1459 0.086 0.019 0.038 0.084 0.175 4866 0.072 0.018 0.034 0.068 0.199 -0.014 -2.59   
Ln(RetVol) 1459 -2.008 -2.355 -2.007 -1.637 0.576 4866 -2.056 -2.401 -2.053 -1.701 0.534 -0.048 -2.84   
ILLIQ 942 -0.515 -1.125 -0.717 -0.039 0.837 3446 -0.712 -1.389 -0.945 -0.157 0.922 -0.197 -6.25     
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the dependent variables and the control variables used in the analyses. The treatment sample includes 25,791 firm-years 
from countries that mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. The control sample includes 6,325 firm-years from countries that do not require IFRS reporting 
during our sample period. Panel A reports average management forecast frequency (Freq) by country for the pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods. Freq is the 
number of management forecasts issued in year t. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year falls in or after 2005. Panel B reports summary statistics 
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by group for the pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods. Issue is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one management forecast in year t. Size is 
the natural log of market value. ROA is net income divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. 
EarnVol is the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by total assets over the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. RetVol is the standard 
deviation of annual stock returns over the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. ILLIQ is the liquidity factor score extracted from three liquidity 
variables (zero returns, price impact, and bid-ask spreads) using factor analysis with oblique rotation. Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, EarnVol, and RetVol are 
measured in year t-1.  
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Table 3: Voluntary Disclosure Effects of IFRS Adoption    
      
  Dependent Variable = Freq   Dependent Variable = Issue 
  
         
Post×IFRS 0.5103*** 0.4444***  0.5579*** 0.5146*** 
 (0.072) (0.072)  (0.083) (0.085) 
Size  0.1893***   0.2251*** 
  (0.007)   (0.009) 
ROA  0.5174***   0.7237*** 
  (0.080)   (0.111) 
MTB  -0.0003   -0.0003 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Leverage  0.0071   -0.0776 
  (0.064)   (0.090) 
EarnVol  0.0021   0.0104 
  (0.003)   (0.010) 
Ln(RetVol)  0.1726***   0.2482*** 
  (0.021)   (0.031) 
      
Year Fixed Effects Y Y  Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y  Y Y 
Pseudo Rsq 0.193 0.228  0.177 0.202 
Observations 32,116 32,116   32,116 32,116 
 
This table presents results on voluntary disclosure effects of IFRS using 32,116 firm-year observations from the 
treatment and control samples. We employ Poisson (Logit) regressions when the dependent variable is Freq (Issue). 
Freq is the number of management forecasts issued in year t. Issue is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm 
issues at least one management forecast in year t. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year falls in or 
after 2005. IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one for countries that mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. 
Size is the natural log of market value. ROA is net income divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. 
Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. EarnVol is the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by 
total assets over the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. RetVol is the standard deviation of annual 
stock returns over the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, EarnVol, and 
RetVol are measured in year t-1. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm with year and country fixed effects included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure Effects of IFRS Adoption 
     
  Dependent 
Variable = Freq 
Dependent 
Variable = Issue 
Dependent 
Variable = Freq 
Dependent 
Variable = Issue  
          
Post*IFRS 0.5520*** 0.6267*** 0.4874*** 0.5883*** 
 (0.074) (0.084) (0.073) (0.086) 
Financial -0.0979 -0.1168 -0.1818** -0.2197*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.073) (0.078) 
Post×IFRS×Financial -0.2332*** -0.3607*** -0.2638*** -0.4273*** 
 (0.085) (0.091) (0.080) (0.091) 
Size   0.2006*** 0.2434*** 
   (0.007) (0.009) 
ROA   0.3474*** 0.5498*** 
   (0.077) (0.108) 
MTB   -0.0003 -0.0003 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage   0.0590 -0.0193 
   (0.066) (0.090) 
EarnVol   0.0022 0.0107 
   (0.004) (0.009) 
Ln(RetVol)   0.1531*** 0.2251*** 
   (0.021) (0.031) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo Rsq 0.196 0.180 0.233 0.207 
Observations 32,116 32,116 32,116 32,116 
 
We employ Poisson (Logit) regressions when the dependent variable is Freq (Issue). Financial is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm is in the financial industry (i.e. in SIC codes 6001-6999). Freq is the number of 
management forecasts issued in year t. Issue is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one 
management forecast in year t. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year falls in or after 2005. IFRS is 
an indicator variable equal to one for countries that mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. Size is the natural 
log of market value. ROA is net income divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is long-
term debt divided by total assets. EarnVol is the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by total assets over 
the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. RetVol is the standard deviation of annual stock returns over 
the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, EarnVol, and RetVol are 
measured in year t-1. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm with year and country fixed effects included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure Effects Conditional on IFRS Adoption 
                
 Dependent Variable = Freq   Dependent Variable = Issue 
 Difference between 
Local GAAP and 
IFRS (BaeScore) 
Legal 
Enforcement 
(Law) 
Membership in 
the European 
Union (EU=1) 
 Difference 
between Local 
GAAP and IFRS 
(BaeScore) 
Legal 
Enforcement 
(Law) 
Membership in 
the European 
Union (EU=1) 
  
  
Post×Conditioning 0.0261*** 0.0992*** 0.1681***  0.0238** 0.1731*** 0.0799 
 (0.007) (0.037) (0.065)  (0.009) (0.056) (0.090) 
Size 0.1892*** 0.1892*** 0.1900***  0.2428*** 0.2424*** 0.2436*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
ROA 0.5639*** 0.5612*** 0.5629***  0.9031*** 0.9112*** 0.8994*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)  (0.147) (0.148) (0.148) 
MTB -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage 0.0876 0.0866 0.0882  -0.0203 -0.0198 -0.0193 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)  (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
EarnVol 0.0025 0.0024 0.0025  0.0122 0.0121 0.0121 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ln(RetVol) 0.1612*** 0.1613*** 0.1632***  0.2554*** 0.2583*** 0.2561*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
 
 
Country and Year Fixed Effects Included  
 
Country and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Pseudo Rsq 0.246 0.246 0.246  0.229 0.229 0.229 
Observations 25,791 25,791 25,791   25,791 25,791 25,791 
 
This table presents results on voluntary disclosure effects of IFRS and country-level institutional characteristics for 25,791 firm-years from the treatment sample. 
We employ Poisson (Logit) regressions when the dependent variable is Freq (Issue). BaeScore is the difference between Local GAAP and IFRS, based on the 
Bae et al. (2008) gaapdiff1 score of how domestic GAAP differs from IAS on 21 key accounting dimensions. Law is the rule of law variable for the year 2005 
from Kaufmann et al. (2009). EU is an indicator variable equal to one for member states in the European Union. Freq is the number of management forecasts 
issued in year t. Issue is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one management forecast in year t. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm-year falls in or after 2005. Size is the natural log of market value. ROA is net income divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is 
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long-term debt divided by total assets. EarnVol is the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by total assets over the past five years, minimum three years’ 
data required. RetVol is the standard deviation of annual stock returns over the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, 
EarnVol, and RetVol are measured in year t-1. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm with year and country fixed effects included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6 Panel A: Robustness Test on Litigation Risk 
     
  Dependent 
Variable = Freq 
Dependent 
Variable = Issue 
Dependent 
Variable = Freq 
Dependent 
Variable = Issue   
     
Post×IFRS 0.5769*** 0.5968*** 0.4886*** 0.5306*** 
 (0.074) (0.085) (0.074) (0.087) 
Litigation 0.3338*** 0.3001*** 0.4014*** 0.3755*** 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) 
Post×IFRS×Litigation -0.2732*** -0.1613* -0.1796** -0.0659 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.077) (0.084) 
Size   0.1968*** 0.2338*** 
   (0.007) (0.009) 
ROA   0.5114*** 0.7278*** 
   (0.078) (0.111) 
MTB   -0.0003 -0.0003 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage   0.1164* 0.0569 
   (0.064) (0.090) 
EarnVol   0.0023 0.0110 
   (0.003) (0.010) 
Ln(RetVol)   0.1606*** 0.2301*** 
   (0.021) (0.031) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo Rsq 0.194 0.178 0.231 0.205 
Observations 32,116 32,116 32,116 32,116 
 
We employ Poisson (logit) regressions when the dependent variable is Freq (Issue). Litigation is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm is in a high litigation risk industry (i.e. in SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-
3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374 and 8731-8734). Freq is the number of management forecasts issued in year t. Issue is 
an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one management forecast in year t. Post is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm-year falls in or after 2005. IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one for countries that 
mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. Size is the natural log of market value. ROA is net income divided by 
total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. EarnVol is the 
standard deviation of annual earnings divided by total assets over the past five years, minimum three years’ data 
required. RetVol is the standard deviation of annual stock returns over the past five years, minimum three years’ data 
required. Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, EarnVol, and RetVol are measured in year t-1. We report coefficient estimates 
and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by firm with year and country fixed 
effects included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 6 Panel B: Robustness Test on Different Sample Specifications 
              
  Criteria 1: Remove 
countries with less than 
100 observations 
 Criteria 2: 
Remove 
non-
forecasters 
 
Criteria 3: Begin 
sample period in 2004 
 Criteria 4: Remove 
countries with no 
forecasters in pre-IFRS 
period 
 Criteria 5: Retain constant 
sample in pre- and post-
IFRS periods    
 
 
 Freq Issue   Freq  Freq Issue   Freq Issue   Freq Issue  
              
Post×IFRS 0.4438*** 0.5133***  0.1885***  0.3365*** 0.3579***  0.4450*** 0.5153***  0.4832*** 0.5122*** 
 (0.072) (0.085)  (0.035)  (0.065) (0.079)  (0.072) (0.085)  (0.077) (0.091) 
Size 0.1892*** 0.2264***  0.0850***  0.1892*** 0.2249***  0.1890*** 0.2255***  0.1901*** 0.2340*** 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.011) 
ROA 0.5122*** 0.7152***  0.0889*  0.5105*** 0.7086***  0.5095*** 0.7149***  0.6150*** 0.7628*** 
 (0.080) (0.111)  (0.048)  (0.080) (0.112)  (0.080) (0.111)  (0.114) (0.148) 
MTB -0.0003 -0.0003  -0.0001***  -0.0003 -0.0003  -0.0003 -0.0003  -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.0040 -0.0836  0.0148  0.0088 -0.0768  0.0089 -0.0788  0.0381 -0.0206 
 (0.065) (0.090)  (0.038)  (0.064) (0.090)  (0.065) (0.090)  (0.089) (0.115) 
EarnVol 0.0021 0.0105  -0.0018  0.0021 0.0103  0.0021 0.0104  0.0046** 0.0319 
 (0.003) (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.003) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.024) 
Ln(RetVol) 0.1710*** 0.2474***  0.0534***  0.1719*** 0.2472***  0.1701*** 0.2463***  0.1403*** 0.2076*** 
 (0.022) (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.021) (0.032)  (0.022) (0.031)  (0.028) (0.039) 
              
Year Fixed Effects Y Y  Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y  Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Pseudo Rsq 0.2285 0.2026  0.0583  0.1561 0.1088  0.2281 0.2027  0.2354 0.2169 
Observations 31,860 31,860  10,703  26,599 26,599  31,965 31,965  23,181 23,181 
 
We employ Poisson (logit) regressions when the dependent variable is Freq (Issue). Freq is the number of management forecasts issued in year t. Issue is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one management forecast in year t. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year falls in or after 
2005. IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one for countries that mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. Size is the natural log of market value. ROA is net 
income divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. EarnVol is the standard deviation of annual 
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earnings divided by total assets over the past five years, minimum three years’ data required. RetVol is the standard deviation of annual stock returns over the 
past five years, minimum three years’ data required. Size, ROA, MTB, Leverage, EarnVol, and RetVol are measured in year t-1. We report coefficient estimates 
and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by firm with year and country fixed effects included. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7: Liquidity Effects from IFRS Adoption and Management Forecasts   
       
  Dependent 
Variable = ILLIQ 
Dependent Variable 
= Rank_ILLIQ 
   Dependent 
Variable = ILLIQ 
Dependent Variable 
= Rank_ILLIQ    
             
Post×IFRS -0.0832*** -0.3228***  Post×IFRS -0.0769*** -0.3152*** 
 (0.028) (0.080)   (0.028) (0.082) 
Freq -0.0131 0.0030  Issue -0.0245 -0.0086 
 (0.012) (0.037)   (0.020) (0.058) 
Post×IFRS×Freq -0.0666*** -0.2558***  Post×IFRS×Issue -0.1363*** -0.4635*** 
 (0.013) (0.040)   (0.024) (0.068) 
Size -0.2883*** -0.8327***  Size -0.2938*** -0.8514*** 
 (0.005) (0.016)   (0.005) (0.016) 
Ln(RetVol) -0.1387*** -0.4034***  Ln(RetVol) -0.1403*** -0.4090*** 
 (0.015) (0.040)   (0.015) (0.040) 
Ln(Turnover) -0.1283*** -0.3659***  Ln(Turnover) -0.1304*** -0.3731*** 
 (0.005) (0.014)   (0.005) (0.014) 
       
Year Fixed Effects Y Y  Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y  Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
R-squared 0.601 0.623  R-squared 0.613 0.619 
Observations 20,490 20,490  Observations 20,490 20,490 
 
This table presents results on liquidity effects from voluntary disclosure and IFRS using 20,490 firm-year observations from the treatment and control samples, 
where the treatment sample is restricted to countries in the European Union. We employ OLS regression models. ILLIQ is the liquidity factor score extracted 
from three liquidity variables (zero returns, price impact, and bid-ask spreads) using factor analysis with oblique rotation. Rank_ILLIQ is the raw Factor score 
ranked into ten deciles. Freq is the number of management forecasts issued in year t. Issue is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one 
management forecast in year t. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year falls in or after 2005. IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one for 
countries that mandate IFRS adoption in December 2005. Size is the natural log of market value. RetVol is the standard deviation of annual stock returns over the 
past five years, minimum three years’ data required. Turnover is the twelve-month median of monthly turnover. Size, RetVol, and Turnover are measured in year 
t-1. ILLIQ and Rank_ILLIQ are measured as of month +7 after the fiscal year-end. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm with year and country fixed effects included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
